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PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Introduction
PROF. KATSORIS: Our first panel deals with pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreements. The industry generally is not required to have an
arbitration agreement in order to be brought to the forum, because,
by belonging to the SROs, the industry has to submit to arbitration. 6
That's not true with the public. The pre-dispute arbitration agreement
is what forces the public into the arbitration forum.
Many problems have arisen in connection with these pre-dispute
arbitration agreements. Today we've assembled two gentlemen who
started a lot of these headaches when they opposed each other in
Shearson v. McMahon.17 The first speaker on this subject will be Ted
Krebsbach.
Panelists
MR. KREBSBACH: Thank you, Professor Katsoris and Chairman
Donaldson. Just as there has been a lot of change in the whole area of
securities arbitration over the past ten to twenty years, as Professor
Katsoris has pointed out, there have been many changes with respect
to pre-dispute arbitration clauses. In fact, if you look historically over
the years, I would say that most of the major issues that arise or have
arisen with respect to securities arbitration have been connected di-
rectly to the pre-dispute arbitration clause.
Things used to be a lot simpler than they are today. If you go back
ten years, the law of the land was pretty clear. The Supreme Court
stated in Wilko v. Swan'8 in 1953 that pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments could not be enforced with respect to disputes under the '33
Act,19 and there was pretty much of a consensus that this rationale
also applied to the Exchange Act of 1934.20 In fact, back in those
days, pre-dispute arbitration agreements were simple. They said that
the parties agreed to submit all of their disputes to arbitration, and
many also said that New York law would apply to any disputes. That
pretty much was the state of pre-dispute arbitration clauses until the
mid-1980s.
The first problem that came up with respect to pre-dispute arbitra-
tion clauses was SEC rule 15c2-2,' passed in the mid-eighties, where
16. NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 600(a), 2600.
17. ShearsonlAmerican Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). Theodore
A. Krebsbach represented the petitioner and Theodore Grant Eppenstein repre-
sented the respondents. Id. at 222.
18. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
19. Idi at 438; see Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1988).
20. Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1988).
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1983), repealed by Exchange Act Release No. 25034,
[1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,163 (Oct. 15, 1987).
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the SEC required firms to put specific language in their agreements
that said that investors do not have to arbitrate disputes under federal
securities laws.' That was perhaps the first time that the language of
the pre-dispute arbitration agreements received a lot of attention.
The firms were opposed to this for a number of reasons: (1) they
didn't like to have anyone dictate to them what they could put in a
private contract, and (2) firms felt that the Wilko case was limited to
the 1933 Act and should not apply to all of the federal securities laws.
In fact, in the McMahon' case in 1987 and the Rodriguez 4 case in
1989, the Supreme Court overturned its rationale in Wilko and said
there was no reason that federal securities law claims cannot be arbi-
trated across the board.35 As everyone recalls, the SEC played a ma-
jor role in both of those cases, but primarily in the McMahon case
where they filed an amicus brief on behalf of the brokerage firms.
The SEC subsequently revoked rule 15c2-2, 6 but there continued
to be litigation with respect to the pre-dispute arbitration clause be-
cause many agreements with the old 15c2-2 language still existed. As
you might expect, the courts went both ways on the issue of whether
those old agreements prohibited arbitration of federal securities law
claims. Some courts said these agreements evidenced intent of the
parties not to arbitrate the disputes, but other courts disagreed. Even-
tually, because of McMahon and because the firms changed the lan-
guage in their agreements, this issue died and is no longer with us.
The next big controversy had to do with what was called the AMEX
window.27 As Mr. Eppenstein is well aware, having argued the Court
of Appeals case 28 successfully on this issue, the problem was that the
agreements said firms agree to arbitrate pursuant to the rules of the
various stock exchanges-including the American Stock Exchange-
and there was a particular rule at the American Stock Exchange
("AMEX") that said members of the AMEX agree to arbitrate at the
American Arbitration Association at the election of the customer.
There was a lot of litigation between the firms and their customers
about whether firms, because of that rule, had to arbitrate all of their
disputes at the AAA.
22. Id.
23. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
24. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
25. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238; Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 485.
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1983), repealed by Exchange Act Release No. 25034,[1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) J 84,163 (Oct. 15, 1987).
27. American Stock Exchange Const. art. VIII, § 2(c) (1992) (providing that if any
of the parties to a controversy is a customer, the customer may elect to arbitrate
before the American Arbitration Association in the City of New York, unless the
customer has expressly agreed in writing to submit only to the arbitration procedure
of the American Stock Exchange).
28. Cowen & Co. v. Anderson, 558 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1990).
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Again, and you'll see this pattern historically, these issues were de-
bated extensively at forums such as this, but ultimately resolved by the
courts. Many firms again amended the language in their agreements
to say that not only do I agree to arbitrate pursuant to the rules of
these Exchanges, but I agree to arbitrate at that particular Exchange.
That, combined with the fact that there were a lot of rule changes
after McMahon-both at the AAA and at the self-regulatory organi-
zation forums-narrowed the differences between the forums and
caused that issue to lessen in importance, just like the SEC rule 15c2-
2. It's not a major issue anymore.
I think that the lesson we learned is that public debate, the resource
of going to the courts, and getting decisions back and forth, combined
with changing the language of the agreements to meet the needs of
both sides eventually solved the problem.
One of the issues that is present throughout all of this debate is the
issue of the contract of adhesion 9 It's worth noting briefly, not be-
cause I think it's that important anymore, but because people con-
tinue to raise it. It was raised at the time of McMahon. Basically the
argument is that firms have all of the bargaining power when they
create these agreements and require customers to sign them in order
to do business, and therefore, they are unenforceable contracts of
adhesion.
This issue was addressed in the McMahon case. It has been ad-
dressed in a lot of court cases before and after. The bottom line is that
even if these agreements are contracts of adhesion, they are still
enforceable.
A lot of firms will require customers to sign these agreements.
However, there is a clearly articulated national policy favoring arbitra-
tion in the United States as a result of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"). 30 The courts have recognized this strong national policy
favoring arbitration, and because there is such a strong policy favoring
arbitration, the arbitration agreements are enforceable contracts of
adhesion. They are not against public policy.
29. A contract of adhesion is a "[s]tandardized contract form offered to consumers
of goods and services on essentially 'take it or leave it' basis without affording con-
sumer realistic opportunity to bargain and under such conditions that consumer can-
not obtain desired product or services except by acquiescing in form contract."
Black's Law Dictionary 40 (6th ed. 1990). For a full discussion of contracts of adhe-
sion, see John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts, §§ 9-44 to 9-
46 (3d ed. 1987).
30. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988). The Federal Arbitration Act was enacted in 1925 by
Congress to "place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other private con-
tracts and reduce costly litigation." William A. Gregory & William J. Schneider, Se-
curities Arbitration: A Need For Continued Reform, 17 Nova L Rev. 1223, 1227
(1993) (citing H.R. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1924)). The FAA also provides
for the confirmation, vacation, or modification of awards made in arbitration. 9
U.S.C. §§ 9-11.
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Again, that's an issue that has always come up when people discuss
pre-dispute arbitration agreements. I don't think it is as big an issue
today as it used to be. It is also important to recognize that an inves-
tor can always go to a firm that doesn't require an arbitration
agreement.
Another issue is that of notice, and this again became a hot issue
during the McMahon days. Do customers really know what they are
signing when they sign these agreements, and do they receive proper
notice of what they really agree to when they agree to arbitrate? Do
they receive notice that the arbitration process is different than the
court process?
There was quite an extensive, public debate after McMahon about
the whole issue of losing rights in arbitration. It was framed as an
issue of rights, and this culminated in New York Stock Exchange Rule
636(a), 31 which is what the industry will say is a very one-sided notice
provision that they are now required to put in the arbitration agree-
ment. Basically it states that if you agree to arbitrate, you're waiving
your rights to a jury, you're waiving your rights to go to court, to cer-
tain appellate rights, and to'receive an opinion with factual findings
and a statement of the law.
The reason firms feel this is one-sided is because there is nothing in
the notice to tell you the benefits you're gaining by arbitration. None-
theless, there has been an expansion of what has gone into the pre-
dispute clause, which started out as a simple concept, and now we've
added a whole provision about what rights you supposedly waive.
We must also note, within that particular provision of the pre-dis-
pute agreement, that there will be a minority of people from the se-
curities industry on the panel. This particular rule also required that
you highlight in boldface language in your pre-dispute arbitration
agreement-just before the place where the customer signs-that
you're signing an arbitration agreement and that you recognize that
you're signing an arbitration agreement.32
So, already the pre-dispute arbitration clause has gone from a very
simple two-line notice that everything goes to arbitration, to a number
31. New York Stock Exchange Rule 636(a) requires that any pre-dispute arbitra-
tion clause incorporate highlighted disclosure language notifying the customer that
(1) arbitration is final and binding, (2) the parties are waiving their right to seek reme-
dies in court, (3) pre-arbitration discovery is generally more limited than and different
from court proceedings, (4) the arbitrators' award is not required to include factual
findings or legal reasoning and any party's right to appeal or to seek modification of
rulings by the arbitrators is strictly limited, and (5) the panel of arbitrators will typi-
cally include a minority of arbitrators who were or are affiliated with the securities
industry. NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 636(a), 2636; see also Uniform Code,
supra note 14, § 31, at 24 (mirroring the language of NYSE Rule 636(a)).
32. See NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 636(b), 2636; see also Uniform Code,
supra note 14, § 31(b), at 24 (requiring separate initialling by the customer, in addi-
tion to highlighting the statement).
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of clauses. If you look at the standard customer agreement, the arbi-
tration language is the only block of highlighted language in the agree-
ment, and in some agreements it measures about one-third of the
agreement. So, there has been quite an evolution in the clause over
the years.
The next issue that involved the pre-dispute arbitration clause had
to do with class action disputes. This came up after McMahon and
most particularly after Rodriguez, which involved arbitration disputes
under the '33 Act, and there was extensive public debate. We don't
have to go into a lot of the reasons why the NYSE and the SEC ulti-
mately came up with the rule that they did, but it's now uniform
across the board that class actions are not arbitrated at the SROs.33
Again, that language is language that has to be specifically in the cus-
tomer agreement-the pre-dispute arbitration clause-that says I
agree I will not arbitrate a class action.3
As we sit here today, I think it's clear that the pre-dispute arbitra-
tion clause has played a role in many of the major issues, or most of
them, that have come up over the last ten years; and, I think we'll see
as we discuss the substantive issues on the program-eligibility, dis-
covery, punitive damages-it's still the case today.
I would say that the two biggest issues on the agenda today are
punitive damages and eligibility. I don't plan on getting into the mer-
its of them, because I have only a couple of more minutes to speak.
There will be plenty of conversation with respect to these issues today.
I would just like to frame them as they relate to the pre-dispute arbi-
tration clause.
Obviously, punitive damages is one of the most emotional issues
that we all faced with respect to arbitration over the past ten years.
I've been a member of the NASD National Arbitration Committee
and the Securities Industry Association Punitive Damage Subcommit-
tee over the past few years. I've seen an incredible amount of debate
over this topic. A lot of good points have been raised on both sides. I
can safely say there is no consensus. If you put two people in the
room, you can't get a consensus on what is the best way to handle this
particular issue.
One thing that's clear, however, is that many member firms are lo-
cated in New York, and the New York Stock Exchange is located in
New York. The law of the State of New York, as articulated by the
highest court in the state in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.,3 says it's
33. See NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 600(d), 2600; Uniform Code, supra
note 14, § 1(d)(i), at 6.
34. See NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 636(e), 2636; Uniform Code, supra
note 14, § 31(e), at 24.
35. 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
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against public policy for arbitrators to award punitive damages in New
York State.36 That's the law in New York State.
Apart from the many policy reasons why I personally feel that puni-
tive damages are inappropriate in arbitration, I just want to make the
point that it is the law in the state that we're sitting in right now. New
York Stock Exchange Rule 636(d), which states that pre-dispute
agreements can't limit the ability of arbitrators to make an award,37
has to be read in the context of what the law is in New York State.
As Professor Katsoris and Chairman Donaldson also pointed out,
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.38 is currently before
the United States Supreme Court, so we will be receiving some direc-
tion from the highest court in the land on this particular issue. The
lower courts have gone in both directions on this topic.
The eligibility rule is another matter that has been of major concern
both to investors and to brokerage firms over the past three or four
years, especially in the area of limited partnership litigation. There
will be a lot of debate over this topic over the next couple of hours.
There is a rule at the SROs that claims are not eligible for submis-
sion to arbitration if the occurrence or event took place more than six
years ago.39 Many firms take the position that if the occurrence took
place over six years ago, it's simply not eligible for arbitration. It
should not even be given to the arbitrators. Investors and firms have
generated much litigation about whether the appropriate place to re-
solve this is in arbitration or in court. As you might imagine the
courts have, again, gone both ways on this issue.4 °
As we debate these issues over the coming hours, the important
point is to recognize that ali of the issues that have come up, like the
36. Id at 795.
37. See NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 636(d), 2636; see also Uniform Code,
supra note 14, § 31(d), at 24 ("No agreement shall include any condition that ... limits
the ability of the arbitrators to make any award.").
38. On March 6, 1995 the United States Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, re-
versed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the arbitration panel's punitive damage
award. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., No. 94-18, 1995 U.S. LEXIS
1820, at *21 (U.S. March 6, 1995), rev'g 20 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1994).
39. See NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 603, 2603; Uniform Code, supra note
14, § 4(a), at 9.
40. Compare Chemical Futures & Options, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 832 F.
Supp. 1188, 1194 (N.D. IM. 1993) (holding that because the arbitration agreement,
according to its terms, is governed by New York law, courts, not arbitrators, decide
statute of limitations issues) with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Shad-
dock, 822 F. Supp. 125, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that the arbitrators should de-
cide any limitations issues despite the existence of a New York choice-of-law
provision). The New York Court of Appeals recently held that where the parties have
mutually agreed that New York law shall govern a dispute, the court determines the
statute of limitations question. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, No. 11,
1995 N.Y. LEXIS 233, at *2 (N.Y. Feb. 21, 1995); see also Gary Spencer, State Role in
Securities Arbitration Defined, N.Y. LJ., Feb. 22, 1995, at 1 (discussing the New York
Court of Appeals decision in Luckie).
1516 [Vol. 63
SYMPOSIUM
ones before us today, are very emotional, with a lot of heated argu-
ment on both sides. However, if you look back historically, we've
been able to work together to resolve many of them. Sometimes it
has taken a combination of the industry members, the courts, SRO
forums, and arbitration committees, but ultimately we've been able to
work them out. Sometimes the courts decide, other times we resolve
issues in symposia such as this. I guess that's one of the many issues
that will be debated today. Thank you.
MR. EPPENSTEIN: I would like to thank Chairman Donaldson
and the Exchange for asking me to appear today with Ted Krebsbach
once again to go over the pre-dispute arbitration agreement.
When Bob Clemente called me and asked if I would like to speak
today, I believe I remarked, "What is there to say that hasn't been
said before?" I think it's quite appropriate for the industry to lead on
this issue since, as Ted said, this is a contract of adhesion, and after all,
what power does the customer have in this area?
Looking for some inspiration as to what to say, I reflected a bit
upon the securities arbitration arena in the past seven years since the
McMahon case, and I reviewed a motion that I'm currently opposing.
For years I've fought for the customers' right to choose between the
court and arbitration. I'm now working on a brief arguing the custom-
ers' right to pursue an arbitration here at the New York Stock Ex-
change in a multimillion dollar case. I am also opposing a motion
brought by the broker-dealer claiming that the customer dispute is not
arbitrable, despite the fact that my client signed a broadly worded pre-
dispute arbitration agreement. Then it struck me: I'm citing the same
cases today that Ted Krebsbach cited seven years ago. Things really
have changed.
When Ted and I argued the issue on March 3, 1987 before the
Supreme Court in McMahon, we were addressing whether the pre-
dispute agreement was enforceable years after the Wilko decision and
a few years following some dicta in another decision by the Court in
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd.' The Supreme Court in McMa-
hon, by a five-four margin, agreed with the industry's position.4'
How the court would rule today given the issues and the current
climate, such as the "state-of-the-art pre-dispute clause," I don't
know.4 3 The securities industry, now that it has a contract of adhe-
41. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
42. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
43. See generally Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., No. 94-18, 1995
U.S. LEXIS 1820 (U.S. March 6, 1995), rev'g 20 F3d 713 (7th Cir. 1994). The Court
states, "Respondents drafted an ambiguous document, and they cannot now claim the
benefit of the doubt." Il at *18. The Court, therefore, rejected Shearson's argument
that the inclusion of a New York choice-of-law provision expresses an intent to pre-
clude an award of punitive damages. Id at *17.
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sion, has apparently turned its attention to how many other rights of
the customer it can eradicate in the customer agreement.
Sometimes, to understand where we are with controversial issues,
it's necessary to review the road that took us here. I'll remind you of
a few highlights. Professor Katsoris and Ted Krebsbach gave their
usual wonderful renditions, but I would like to touch on a few other
points.
You may recall when Judge Timbers in 1953, then a lawyer for the
SEC, argued for the customer in Wilko v. Swan." From that point on,
the SEC, for thirty years, through a number of securities act releases,
was consistent and even said in a Securities Exchange Act release that
the pre-dispute arbitration clause was an unfair trade practice.
The SEC also promulgated a rule that Ted Krebsbach mentioned
before, 15c2-2,45 in 1983, which imposed requirements on the industry
that if they were going to use a pre-dispute clause, the customer had
to be informed that he still had the right to litigate federal securities
fraud claims in court. The SEC's position on the arbitration clause
then changed dramatically when it wrote an amicus brief supporting
Shearson's position in McMahon. Justice O'Connor wrote the major-
ity opinion in McMahon finding that the pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ment was a bargained for agreement4 6 and would be enforceable.
Only a few months after the McMahon decision was rendered, I was
asked to appear at a securities conference where the hot topic was
how broker-dealers can best structure their customer agreements so
that they will be able to protect their bottom line. This is not so much
different from what has been going on recently. Given the enthusiasm
among the attendees present at that conference, there was little doubt
in my mind that we were going to see some creative revisions to the
arbitration clauses.
The arbitration clause that Shearson gave the McMahon's to sign
was simple, as Ted Krebsbach mentioned. It said something like this:
"Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy
arising out of or relating to my accounts, to transactions with you for
me or to this agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the rules then in effect at the NASD,
the New York Stock Exchange, or the American Stock Exchange."
The arbitration agreement before the court in McMahon is about
ten years old now. I would like to tell you something about some of
the more recent clauses in use today. There was one that Securities
Week recently made note of.4 7 In one paragraph, that agreement per-
44. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
45. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1983), repealed by Exchange Act Release No. 25034,
[1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,163 (Oct. 15, 1987).
46. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.
47. Attorneys Ask NYSE and NASD To Explore Smith Barney's Customer Agree-
ment, Sec. Wk., Nov. 7, 1994, at 1.
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mits the broker-dealer to go to court to challenge any claim brought
beyond the statute of limitations period or beyond other time bar pe-
riods like the six-year eligibility rule. The broker-dealer charitably
grants the right to the customer to do the same thing. Of course, that
would never happen.
Another provision in that agreement embraces New York law re-
garding damages recoverable in arbitration without giving effect to
principles of conflicts of law. But in an attempt to limit the rights of
the customers residing outside of New York, the broker-dealer
chooses the law of those foreign states, trying to find a state where
common law claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty have less
than a six-year life span. All of this is contained in one pre-dispute
arbitration clause. Another firm gives the customer the right to go to
court but it must be in New York and only before a judge since a jury
trial is waived.
There are many troubling aspects concerning the manner in which
the pre-dispute clauses are forced on the public. Many firms have
their so-called financial consultants obtain the customer's signature on
multi-page documents. Here's one example. It's an eight-page agree-
ment entitled "Commodity New Account Booklet" where about ten
signature lines appear throughout the document. The arbitration
agreement is on page five, buried somewhere. In another customer
agreement, the arbitration clause appears on the back at the bottom,
at paragraph twenty-eight.
But it really doesn't matter where the clause appears. It really
doesn't matter what disclosure there is to the customer because we all
know with securities accounts the customer either signs the agreement
and opens up the account or he can't open up that account. And he
can't go next door to Merrill Lynch or to Lehman Brothers or to Paine
Webber because every big firm has the same policy. You either sign it,
or they don't want your business.
I had one client who had approximately a $15 million portfolio, and
he was unhappy with his broker-that's why he came to me. He
wanted to move his account to another firm during the time that we
arbitrated his claim. He went to several firms, found one that he was
satisfied with, and then said to me-when given the new account
form-should I sign this? I said, well, you're in arbitration today, you
wanted to go to court but you couldn't because there is a pre-dispute
arbitration clause. If you want to go and arbitrate if you have another
dispute then go ahead and sign, but maybe the firm will permit you
the opportuity to go to the American Arbitration Association. So,
ask them if you could just slip in that little clause.
He called me back a few days later and he said no. He said they
wouldn't permit him to do that. I said, well, what will they let you do.
He said, "Nothing. They told me they don't want my business unless I
sign up." That's unfortunately indicative of where we are today.
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Now, in normal contract negotiations I would recommend to my
client, or to a prospective client, to retain a lawyer to explain the pro-
visions of this agreement to him. However, since these agreements
aren't subject to negotiation at all, it will make little difference to the
customer whether he understands them or not.
Of course, with a commodity account, there is a separate signature
line as required by a Commodity Futures Trading Commission rule
which states that the firm must accept the customer even if the cus-
tomer doesn't sign on the dotted line where the arbitration clause
appears.48
Another problem is the way these agreements are given to the cus-
tomer. I've heard from so many clients of mine that they are told that
these documents are "red tape" and they have to be signed. And as
you can see, they are all printed, they are not negotiated, and custom-
ers just blindly sign without reading them.
Who wants to read an eight-page document, including all sorts of
things like risk disclosure and all sorts of margin agreement informa-
tion at a time when they are opening up an account with a trusted
brokerage firm with a great reputation? I mean, clients in this world
just don't do that. I have also heard the way financial consultants will
just gloss over the document with the client and have them sign it after
telling them about all of the millions of dollars that they will be able to
make for them in their account.
We're in a situation now where I'm concerned about the clauses
that I'm seeing coming out of creative general counsels' offices.
Where is this all going to stop? What are the limitations and just how
far can the industry go in order to structure a pre-dispute clause where
the public just has no bargaining rights at all?
Unless Congress, the courts, the NASD, the New York Stock Ex-
change, or the SEC steps in, we're headed for more litigation than
arbitration in this area, before the merits are even reached.
Discussion
PROF. KATSORIS: Thank you, Ted. At this point we will open
the forum for brief comments by anybody who wishes to comment on
anything that either of the two panelists said.
MR. LIPNER: When we look at the arbitration laws and we talk
about how it is a contract of adhesion, the United States Supreme
Court has said that it's okay, because we're not suspicious of arbitra-
tion. That's an issue that even Ted Eppenstein could agree with as a
concept, and I think he started off by saying he did. But there is a
more odious piece of the agreement and that's the New York choice-
48. Voluntary Procedure and Compulsory Payments, 17 C.F.R. § 180.3(b)(1)
(1994).
[Vol. 631520
SYMPOSIUM
of-law clause, and that comes from someone who practices law only in
New York.
The fact of the matter is that over the last year or two this former
arbitration lawyer has become a litigator in court. A lot of it stems
from the existence of the New York choice-of-law clause. That's not
the piece that I want to talk about, the New York choice-of-law clause
and the fact that it has engendered all this litigation. Rather, I want to
focus on what the choice-of-law clause does to the states, and what it
does in the system of federalism, and what it does in a system where
each state is a sovereign of sorts.
Many states have blue sky laws.49 The blue sky laws say that certain
practices must be adhered to and that certain remedies exist in the
case of a violation of a blue sky law. Florida, for example, requires
prospectus delivery, not simply filing with the SEC, before taking a
solicitation on a limited partnership.50 Florida blue sky law provides
for attorneys' fees and certain statutory damages in the event of a
violation of the blue sky laws.5 '
But day in and day out we have legal proceedings here in New York
in an attempt to disenfranchise the legislators and judiciary of these
other states. These blue sky provisions contain no waiver provisions.
They say the parties to a securities transaction cannot waive their
rights under these blue sky laws.
The securities industry could not fashion an agreement with its cus-
tomers that waived these blue sky laws. Yet, by using the New York
choice-of-law provision, these blue sky laws are thrown out the win-
dow, and New York law, with its limitations on remedies, with its limi-
tations on rights, comes in the back door. The industry effectively
does with the agreement and the New York choice-of-law clause what
it could not do in any other way. And that's what is wrong with these
agreements.
MR. PELOSO: I think it's time for the industry to step back and
reexamine the pre-dispute provisions in their agreements. I think
what has happened over the past number of years is that the situation
has been turned on its head.
49. Blue Sky Laws are "[a] popular name for state statutes providing for the regu-
lation and supervision of securities offerings and sales, for the protection of citizen-
investors from investing in fraudulent companies." Black's Law Dictionary 173 (6th
ed. 1990).
50. Fla. Stat. ch. 517.07 (1994) (requiring the furnishing of a prospectus before any
security is sold or offered for sale); Stowell v. Ted S. Finkel Inv. Servs., Inc., 489 F.
Supp. 1209, 1224 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (holding that limited partnerships are encompassed
within the Florida Sale of Securities Law's definition of "security"), aff'd on other
grounds, 641 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
51. See, e.g., Petrites v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033, 1036 (5th Cir. Unit B
June 1981) (affirming an award of attorneys' fees where there was a violation of a
Florida Blue Sky Law).
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I can remember in the sixties dealing with cases where the industry
was trying to arbitrate and the public was trying to avoid it. The in-
dustry wanted to do it because it was relatively simple and roughly
fair. The claimants didn't want to do it because they wanted all of the
panoply of federal and state court. That has been totally reversed,
and we seem to be focusing on totally different things.
The reality is, in my opinion, that arbitration was always a good idea
for most claims because it was relatively simple, not complex, rela-
tively swift, reasonably inexpensive, and a good way to get a dispute
dealt with. It has never been a good idea, and has turned out not to
be a good idea, for claims that are complex, where you have non-
lawyers having to render opinions on the securities laws and RICO
statutes, for example. Most of the arbitrators are not lawyers, much
less judges, and they don't have to give opinions. So, you now have a
process that the claimants, it seems to me, want to have, while the
industry is thinking twice about whether they want to have it.
It seems to me the solution is to step back and consider whether
arbitration is a good idea for both sides of the issue, for sophisticated,
complex, and huge claims. My own opinion is that it's not. Both sides
give up the right to appellate review. They give up the safeguards of
evidentiary standards. They give up the discovery rights that they
have. It wouldn't matter whether I was representing a claimant or a
defendant. If there was a reasonably important case, I think both par-
ties are better off in the courthouse. I think that everybody should sit
back and think whether this process is really geared up for the kinds
of claims that are now being presented to it or whether the agree-
ments should limit arbitration to claims up to a certain amount.
MR. WEST: I'm always a little reluctant to volunteer to a law pro-
fessor, but before I came to the states I was a Commissioner with the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission and I was interested in what
Mr. Eppenstein had to say. What did he say? That indeed there is a
very simple and separate agreement to arbitrate in the industry. It's
very clear. The boldface is set out in the language of the CFTC.
If I could elaborate a bit, it's also voluntary. The Commodity Ex-
change Act,52 when it was passed in 1974, provided that arbitration
would be voluntary so that there is also a very clear agreement that
customers understand that by signing this agreement they may be
waiving their right to go to court, but nevertheless they have forty-five
days in which to choose to go to court.53 That's called a 45-day win-
dow, or they can go to a program at the CFTC called reparations.
52. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
53. Voluntary procedure and compulsory payments, 17 C.F.R § 180.3 (1994). Sec-
tions 180.3(b)(3) and (b)(6) provide a 45-day window for election of reparations in
lieu of arbitration. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3(b)(3), (b)(6) (1994). A person suffering losses
resulting from violations of the CFTC may seek reparation-payment-agamst the
violator. See icL § 180.3(b)(3).
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I spent much of my ten years at the CFTC defending the repara-
tions program because the industry disliked it, and the industry would
like to get rid of the 45-day window. I have never quite understood
that, because it's been stated here clearly that the pre-dispute agree-
ment is indeed one of the biggest problems in the current securities
arbitration arena and undoubtedly has cost the industry and the public
a great deal. It seems to me it might be wise to consider indeed mak-
ing arbitration voluntary by that sort of thing, a window in which the
customer could opt out.
I would add that the National Futures Association has an excellent
arbitration program. It has grown in leaps and bounds despite the fact
that arbitration is voluntary in that industry, and, as a result, they
don't have the constant controversy over pre-dispute agreements.
MR. PAGE: I think this discussion highlights what I see as the ma-
jor issue confronting arbitration. From the industry's perspective I
fully appreciate that you would like to have a statute or agreement
implemented that says customers never win no matter what happens.
As a claimant's attorney, and I think others share this view, I would
like to see that any time investors lose money they are guaranteed to
get it all back, plus punitive damages, and the like. Neither of those is
realistic or salable.
What disturbs me in what I've seen in the arbitration process is
what I think started as a good idea-an alternative method of resolv-
ing disputes in a quick and efficient method-is now becoming a legal
morass, as everyone sits and tries to do creative drafting, i.e., how can
I get a step up?
The way arbitration was sold to both the Supreme Court and the
SEC was that essentially you have the same rights in arbitration as
you would have in court. We're not going to use arbitration to limit
the right to recoup damages. We're not going to use arbitration to
limit statutes of limitation.
What has happened is with the creative draftsmanship, not only
have there been attempts to do through the back door what can't be
done through the front door, but you're getting right back to the same
problems that we faced at the courthouse, because that's where we're
all going first. Everybody is spending a lot of money, and it's becom-
ing almost a self-defeating prophecy. We're making it more expen-
sive, more burdensome, and we're undercutting the very goals that we
have for the arbitration process.
I think that we as practitioners and as interested persons have got to
go back to what the focus of the process is. It's not going to be perfect
for everyone. There are going to be problems for everyone. That's
always the key to a system that is the best system because if one side is
always totally happy with it, the other side would always be totally
unhappy with it, and I think we've got to keep that in mind.
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I really think that there are a lot of advantages. Maybe the decision
from the industry's perspective is now to say we don't like it anymore.
That's fine. Make it optional, give the investors the right to go to
court. I've said that a number of times in a number of forums. No
one seems to want that. And I think those of you that have been
there see that arbitration does work. But if we keep cutting it away,
arbitration will go away and then it's not going to be our option any-
more. It's not going to be the investor's option. It will all be back in
the courthouse. I really encourage everyone in approaching the prob-
lem to give some thought to that, because that's very much what I see
as a broad overview of what is happening with the process today.
MS. McGUIRE: I am required to give a disclaimer before I speak
publicly. I do not speak for the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Chairman, or any individual commissioners or my colleagues on
the staff of the Commission. These are my personal views. They are
formed over a long period. I have been working on arbitration since
the creation of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration.
With respect to this topic, I would like to emphasize the role of the
self-regulatory organizations. Everyone, I believe, has said that a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement is a contract of adhesion that the
Supreme Court has said is enforceable. That means it is an area for
the SROs to apply the rules of fair practice or just and equitable prin-
ciples of trade so that the leverage by the firms inherent in a contract
of adhesion, that is, their ability to impose that contract, does not re-
sult in a contract that contains terms that are not explained and as-
sures that the contract itself is consistent with the rules of the SROs.
To me, what that means is that it is very important that there be the
"negative" disclosure, i.e., disclosure of the risks or of the things given
up by the investor. In addition, if indeed the choice-of-law or other
clauses do not violate the SRO rules, which the Commission in its
amicus brief submitted in Mastrobuono says they do, then there prob-
ably is a need for additional disclosure of the consequences of this
creative drafting.
Accordingly, I think it is very timely that we have this Symposium
today, because for about two years we have been living with creative
drafting and there is a gap in the SRO rules. That is, the rules are
either violated or there is a concept that is not being disclosed to cus-
tomers that comes out of the choice-of-law clauses. So, there is either
a need for improved disclosure or for enforcement.
MR. STONE: I've sat here and heard everybody say that we are all
in agreement that this is a contract of adhesion. I'm not sure that is
entirely correct, and obviously, as an industry representative, I
disagree.
As most of the people here today know, there are numerous types
of customer accounts that can be opened at brokerage firms. Custom-
ers have the option, at least at our firm and most of the big firms on
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the Street, to open accounts without a pre-dispute arbitration clause.
So, to say that your client has nowhere to go, or to suggest it is a
contract of adhesion, when you have an alternative, seems to me to be
begging the issue. A client can open the account today, tomorrow, or
last week at Dean Witter and do business with us with no problem
without any pre-dispute contract for arbitration.
I think, however, when brokerage firms do things special-where
we, in our instance, allow clients to borrow money from us-we feel
we have the right to have a different type of contract with that client.
In fact, if the client opens the account with Dean Witter, there is no
pre-dispute contract if he or she simply wants to open a cash account
and do business with us. So, I find it necessary, at least, to raise those
issues. I disagree with some of the other comments since the courts
have generally approved pre-dispute arbitration clauses and I feel that
the clients basically do have a fair way of doing business with at least
our firm.
PROF. KATSORIS: Mike, while you have the floor, when you said
that you don't require an arbitration agreement to open an account,
are you basically talking about a cash account?
MR. STONE: Yes. Certain types of accounts where we do special
things, for example, where we extend money, we feel we have the
right to have a contract which provides us with certain protection.
PROF. KATSORIS: Let me follow-up, Mike. Mr. West raised the
issue of a 45-day window. What do you think of that?
MR. STONE: A 45-day window to go to arbitration or reparation?
MR. WEST: Or court.
MR. STONE: Same issue. We don't want it and we don't need it
for our cash accounts. They can go to court any day they want. I've
just explained to you why I think when we extend money to clients,
we ask for certain things from the clients, and this is one of them.
MR. EPPENSTEIN: Just to put Mike's comments in perspective, I
recall that the last time the SEC and the General Accounting Office
looked at this area, they found over ten million contracts had pre-
dispute arbitration clauses and over ninety-five percent of the margin
agreements and ninety-five percent of the option agreements had pre-
dispute clauses.' That was, I think, around 1989 or 1990, before eve-
ryone just embraced this area. So, I would just like the panel to bear
in mind that we're talking about a major issue in terms of the number
of people out there who are susceptible to this practice.
MS. SHOCKMAN: Based on my experience in representing, at this
point, hundreds of investors and looking at their pre-dispute arbitra-
tion clauses, at least in Arizona, I do not believe customers are being
54. General Accounting Office, GAO/GGD-92-74, Securities Arbitration 28-29
(May 11, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 GAO Report].
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told that they have the option of signing an agreement that does not
have an arbitration provision in it.
Indeed, all of the little old ladies I represent from Sun City and the
retirement communities certainly didn't come in with an interest to
have margin accounts, but have always signed agreements that permit
margin and that contain pre-dispute arbitration provisions in them.
No one has told them they may sign something very simple that
doesn't have these provisions in them. So, customers routinely are
given agreements that have all of these things in them, and they are
not being told that they have the option of not having these provisions
in your agreements.
Panelist
MR. COONEY: Would this be a good time for me to talk about the
banking industry?
PROF. KATSORIS: Yes. Just so we understand that we don't have
a monopoly on confusion regarding pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments, we've invited John Cooney, Senior Counsel at the Bank of
America. Other industries are beginning to follow the securities in-
dustry, banking being one, where they want to settle their disputes by
alternate means. We've invited Mr. Cooney to briefly tell us some of
the problems that the Bank of America has encountered in this
regard.
MR. COONEY: Thank you very much, Professor Katsoris. I have a
handout that I'll pass around in each direction.5 These are examples
of what we've been referring to today as pre-dispute arbitration
clauses of different banks, including a couple of examples of Bank of
America's clauses.
Just as an example, Professor Katsoris made reference to the fact
that questions of arbitration and alternative dispute resolution
("ADR"), which encompasses not only arbitration but mediation and
other forms of dispute resolution alternatives to the court system, are
certainly not limited to the securities industry. I'm told that there is
an attorney in San Francisco who begins his presentations on this sub-
ject by holding up a cereal box that says on the side, "If you buy this
product and have a problem you're required to arbitrate that dispute."
I thought that would be a very good prop, but I was unable to find
such a cereal box before I left home.
In any event, we in the banking industry are also facing questions
about ADR, as I said, arbitration being just one form. But I thought I
would give you just a bit of a perspective about where we have come
from on this issue.
55. Documents contained in Mr. Cooney's handout are on file with the Fordham
Law Review.
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Bank of America has been something of a pioneer with regard to
ADR. It all began in the mid 1980s when the lender liability theory of
recovery from banks came into vogue. Lender liability was and still is
a theory to the effect that the bank bears responsibility for its custom-
ers' business judgment and losses. That theory has become less popu-
lar as the law has evolved, but in the eighties, we suffered some tens of
millions of dollars in jury verdicts. Every single one was reversed on
appeal, but it cost a lot of money to get to that point.
That brings me to a point I would like to make, which is that the
prime reason for our interest in ADR is not large jury verdicts,
although that certainly is a concern, but the cost of the system and the
cost of retaining lawyers in large numbers to spend large amounts of
time on activities that perhaps can be avoided.
In any event, in 1985 we began putting in our mid-level commercial
loan agreements and workout agreements the arbitration clause that
appears at the beginning of your handout. It runs some three pages.
That's the current version of what we call the standard long form arbi-
tration clause.
Just to go through the handout for a moment, the second item is a
one-page arbitration clause that we use for safe deposit box rental
agreements. After that you'll find the entire complaint in a lawsuit
that I will discuss that challenged our right to specify the use of ADR
for disputes involving credit cards and deposit account agreements,
and, at the back, Exhibits A and B are the actual announcements of
those two programs that were sent with statements to the customers.
Then the last items, just by way of comparison and contrast, are
Wells Fargo Bank's Comprehensive Dispute Resolution Program,
which was announced about the same time in 1992, Union Bank's
plan, and then Bank of California's. You'll notice if you look at them
closely that they are very different even though they are all ADR
programs.
One of the big differences between our situation and yours is that I
understand the criticism leveled against the securities industry arbitra-
tion program is its close alliance with the industry. We don't have an
industry sponsor who originated a program of ADR in the banking
industry. At Bank of America, we use, as you wrill see, the services of
the American Arbitration Association. Wells Fargo uses the services
of the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service.
I suppose, though, the equivalent of that criticism against your in-
dustry is the criticism we receive that the bank, as a repeat user of the
services of a certain ADR provider, in our case the AAA, will receive
preferential treatment. We feel that criticism is blunted by the fact
that the AAA is a non-profit organization and its arbitrators are not
employees of the organization, but independent contractors. But we
recognize that criticism is there, and it is hard to avoid it entirely.
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Since the mid-eighties we have expanded the use of ADR at Bank
of America to other fields of our business. We started with commer-
cial loan workout agreements. We've expanded it to vendor contracts,
safe deposit box agreements, and some other areas. We have avoided
some other areas, for example, letters of credit, where we feel that
customers simply will not understand and will be frightened off by
something new and different. But we've had very little customer
resistance with regard to our arbitration clauses. These arbitration
clauses are, for the most part, safe deposit box clauses being an exam-
ple to the contrary, negotiated agreements.
Finally, in June of 1992, Bank of America announced it was making
ADR part of our agreement with deposit account and credit card cus-
tomers. We immediately were sued in a case that's included in the
handout, Badie v. Bank of America56 in the California Superior Court.
As I said, attached as exhibits are the actual announcements of the
program to customers.
In essence what we said was that the further use of those accounts
would constitute an agreement to those provisions. There having
been very little interest prior to that, suddenly there was a great deal
of interest. After we were sued in Badie, we suspended use of those
clauses pending the outcome of that case. We received a number of
complaints as well, both oral and written. Interestingly, most of the
complaints were from lawyers.
In any event, what has happened with the Badie case is that it went
to a non-jury trial after pending for about a year and a half. The trial
judge announced his opinion in favor of the bank on all principal
points. He has not yet completed his written decision.57
Interestingly, with regard to some of the comments made earlier, in
the trial of that case, a prominent point was the argument by the
plaintiffs that if Bank of America were allowed to "get away with
this," other banks will all follow suit and eventually the customer will
not have any choice. I've given you ADR provisions of other promi-
nent banks in California, but certainly those are not all of the banks.
There are many financial institutions in California, and there is no sign
that all banks are going to adopt ADR.
I would like to add a couple of points on the Badie case. As I said,
those provisions have not been implemented during the pendency of
the lawsuit, so two years later we still do not have examples of how it
will work. Second, the bank has adopted a policy that it will not de-
mand ADR when the customer files suit in Small Claims Court. In
California the jurisdictional limit in Small Claims Court is five thou-
sand dollars. So, if there is a claim of up to five thousand dollars, if
56. Badie v. Bank of America, No. 944916 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco, filed
Aug. 4, 1992).
57. Ruling from the bench in favor of Bank of America was issued in August,
1994. See Badie, No. 944916, 1994 WL 660730 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994).
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the customer chooses to go to Small Claims Court, the bank will not
demand arbitration or ADR.
I say ADR because if you look at the clause you'll see it's a combi-
nation of arbitration or in certain circumstances, in particular class ac-
tions, something called reference. Reference is a creature of
California law.58 A referee is appointed by the court. It is an action
that remains in court. The referee hears and decides all issues of fact
and law, and there is an appeal, if either side chooses to do so, just as
in court. The prime benefit of reference is that it is much faster be-
cause it takes the litigants out of standing in a line waiting for a court-
room and a judge.
I'll make some general remarks about what is happening in the
banking industry and particularly in California with regard to ADR.
People in California are choosing sides in the great debate about
ADR. To my dismay, some consumer groups are throwing in with the
trial lawyers to oppose what they call "forced ADR," which is con-
tractually required ADR. I have pointed out to the trial lawyers who
are concerned about maintenance of the civil trial system that ADR is
propping up their trial system. The "three strikes law,"59 three felo-
nies and life in prison, is going to make matters worse by forcing more
trials in criminal cases.
To consumer advocates, I say they should note the advantages of
ADR. There has been a lot of talk around this table about what some
might view as overreaching on the part of some drafters of ADR
clauses. We've gone to some great lengths in devising our clauses to
try to be fair and evenhanded about them.
There are many things we could have put in our clauses that we
didn't. You won't find any specification of the location of the arbitra-
tion hearing or any prohibition of punitive damages in any of our
ADR clauses. That fits hand in glove with my comment earlier that
we're more concerned about moderating the cost of the system than
about the results in individual cases. Note also that our clauses are
mutual in the sense that ADR is required only if either side asks for it,
and either side can do so.
The question often arises about why not make ADR voluntary. The
problem we have with voluntary ADR is that our observation and
experience indicates that as soon as the dispute arises, the whole situa-
tion changes. Certainly mediation is there for anyone to opt for, and
mediation has become a very popular form of ADR, perhaps over-
shadowing arbitration. But mediation always is available. You can
choose to mediate at any time, and that does not impose a result on
the litigants. But concerning arbitration or other forms of ADR in
58. Cal. Civ. & Crim. Ct. Rules Code § 244.2 (West 1994).
59. See Neil A. Lewis, President Foresees Safer U.S., N.Y. Times, Aug. 27,1994, at
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which the result is imposed, our experience indicates that unless it is
agreed on before the dispute arises, there is little likelihood of such
agreement afterwards. Those are my comments with regard to our
situation and our experience.
PROF. KATSORIS: Thank you, Mr. Cooney.
Discussion
MR. BECKLEY: I want to call Mr. Krebsbach as my expert wit-
ness for a couple of questions.
Would you concede, Mr. Krebsbach, that a broker-dealer could
agree with any of its customers to arbitrate punitive damages?
MR. KREBSBACH: In New York?
MR. BECKLEY: Anywhere, as a theoretical process.
MR. KREBSBACH: In New York it's prohibited by law.6°
MR. BECKLEY: Would you concede that the New York Stock Ex-
change rules trump a broker-dealer to the particular choice of
language?
MR. KREBSBACH: I think we perhaps are losing sight of the big
picture here. We're talking about issues of contracts of adhesion and
everything else. Ultimately, we have a system at the New York Stock
Exchange and the SROs in general that is providing a general service
to the investing public and the firms. I think we also have a court
system that is not doing the job, where both investors and institutions
such as banks and brokerage firms feel they are not getting a fair
shake.
Arbitration is trying to come up with an alternative, which clearly is
a better alternative, I think. If you look at the SRO arbitration sys-
tem, you see a system where fifty percent of the claims that are filed
settle and the clients get something. Of the remaining fifty percent,
half get an award in arbitration. Seventy-five percent of the people
that are filing are receiving a recovery in arbitration.
So, if you want to talk about particular language and particular
agreements, I think the SEC and the New York Stock Exchange
clearly can address the specific contracts, but I don't think we should
lose sight of the big picture which is that it's an excellent system.
MR. BECKLEY: Let's go back and focus on the little picture. If
there is a direct conflict between the broker-dealer choice of legal lan-
guage and New York Stock Exchange rules, which one prevails?
60. But see Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., No. 94-18, 1995 U.S.
LEXIS 1820, at *11 (U.S. March 6, 1995) ("[I]f contracting parties agree to include
claims for punitive damages within the issues to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures that
their agreement will be enforced according to its terms even if a rule of state law
would otherwise exclude such claims from arbitration.").
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MR. KREBSBACH: I think the New York Stock Exchange rules
will prevail, but I think you have to look at all of them in conjunction
with the law.
MR. BECKLEY: Finally, could the broker-dealer in its customer
agreement prohibit arbitration on a current basis?
MR. KREBSBACH: Under the New York Stock Exchange rules
you have to arbitrate substantive claims.
MR. BECKLEY: Your answer would be the same for suitability
and fraud cases?
MR. KREBSBACH: Providing it's not inconsistent with any other
area of the law, right.
PROF. KATSORIS: Is that it on cross-examination?
MR. BECKLEY: Yes. Mr. Krebsbach did very well.
PROF. KATSORIS: Two points before we break. One, Caite Mc-
Guire raised a very interesting point that part of the focus should be
on greater disclosure of the effects and consequences of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses. I think we have to do more of such disclosure.
In that connection, in addition to requiring the highlighting of the
arbitration clause in the agreement, SICA's Uniform Code has an ad-
ditional requirement of separately initialing the highlighted statement
that says the agreement contains a pre-dispute arbitration clause. 61 In
other words, you not only had to sign the agreement, but you had to
separately initial the statement that indicated where in the agreement
the arbitration clause was located. Unfortunately, no SRO has yet
enacted that separate initialing requirement, even though it has been
in the SICA Uniform Code for years.
Ted, I hate to raise the next issue because I think it will take longer.
SICA also enacted section 31(d),62 a clause prohibiting conditions that
limit the ability of arbitrators to make any award. How is that consis-
tent with all these restrictive clauses that we see being inserted in
these arbitration agreements?
MR. KREBSBACH: Well, I think there also is a provision in the
New York Stock Exchange rules that says you can't ask an arbitrator
to do something that's inconsistent with the law. Maybe I'm wrong on
that. I would like to take a second to look at my notes.
PROF. KATSORIS: Why don't we take our coffee break. You'll
look at it and then answer it, and then we'll move on to the next panel.
(A recess was taken.)
MR. KREBSBACH: I may have misspoken at the end of the last
session about specific New York Stock Exchange rules. The point I
wanted to make was that it's clearly the law in New York State in
Garrity v. Lyle Stuar4 Inc.13 about punitive damages.
61. Uniform Code, supra note 14, § 31(b), at 24.
62. Id § 31(d), at 24; see also NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 636(d), 1 2636.
63. 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
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PROF. KATSORIS: Basically, I think under the SICA Uniform
Code, and therefore the New York Stock Exchange rules, you cannot
insert clauses in arbitration agreements that limit the ability of arbitra-
tors to make any award.
MR. KREBSBACH: You have to read the clause with the laws in
New York State. Punitive damages in arbitration are against public
policy. I don't know how you could read that to require a violation of
that law.
MR. PELOSO: It might be worth noting that the SEC in 1989 ap-
proved those rules. They specifically recognize that was subject to
available-the phrase they used was agreements cannot be used to
curtail any rights that the parties may otherwise have had in a judicial
forum.
If punitive damages or attorneys' fees would be available under ap-
plicable law, then the agreement cannot limit parties' rights to request
them nor arbitrators' rights to award them.
MS. McGUIRE: It refers to applicable law on the availability of
punitive damages in a judicial forum and deals with the fact that there
are states that do not allow the awarding of punitive damages in court,
but the SEC does not read the clause as importing Garrity into the
New York Stock Exchange rules. We make that clear in the Mas-
trobuono brief.
As we see it, the case addresses, in part, state law efforts to disad-
vantage arbitration as compared with litigation. The Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, cited by the Commission and the Securities Industry
Association in McMahon, and later by the SIA in the Connolly'4 mat-
ter in the First Circuit, does not allow states to impose limits that are
hostile to the idea that arbitrators can resolve disputes. Limitations
on what arbitrators can do that are not parallel to what judges can do
would be hostile to arbitration as a full alternative dispute resolution
system.
The position is that securities industry arbitration should be an al-
ternative dispute resolution system that allows for the resolution of all
disputes that would be able to be resolved by the courts.
I believe it is quite clear that the release refers to whether punitive
damages are available under applicable law in a judicial forum. If
these damages are available in a judicial forum under applicable law,
the arbitration agreements may not be used to limit them, either ex-
plicitly or through more creative means, such as choice-of-law
provisions.
I wrote the release.
PROF. KATSORIS: I think that's the final word on that.
64. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 956 (1990).
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